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Abstract 
This paper presents findings from interviews with social care service development managers 
and brokers in three local authorities. It follows an earlier study exploring choice and 
flexibility in home care services for older people using council-managed personal budgets. 
That study found that local authorities were limiting the number of providers on framework 
agreements for home care services so that there were sufficient to encourage competition 
but not so many that providers risked having insufficient business to remain financially 
viable. It also found that communication issues were affecting the proper functioning of 
brokerage systems. The current study therefore revisited the same three local authorities to 
investigate changes in framework agreements and developments in brokerage systems. The 
findings showed little change in the number of providers on framework agreements and 
remaining communication challenges for brokers. However, lessons had been learned from 
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unforeseen consequences of framework agreements and progress was being made towards 
encouraging market development and diversification of service provision.  
 
Keywords 
Managed personal budgets, older people, market development, brokerage, choice, home 
care, social care 
 
3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents findings from interviews with service development managers and 
brokers in three local authorities. The purpose was to investigate activities to enable choice 
and flexibility in home care services for older people using council-managed personal 
budgets. It follows an earlier study
1-3
 in the same three councils that explored factors 
affecting the delivery of personalized home care to older people who opted for managed 
personal budgets rather than cash direct payments.  
 
CONTEXT 
The original study was conducted in 2011/12 in a rapidly developing commissioning and 
contracting environment. Its main purpose was to identify changes in commissioning and 
support planning practices, and consider how these changes were enabling increased choice 
and personalisation in home care services for older people using council-managed personal 
budgets. The issue of personalisation for older people using managed personal budgets was 
considered important primarily because few older people were opting to take their budgets 
as direct payments (DPs);
4,5
 in part because of what they perceived to be the burden of 
managing their own support.
6-10
  
 
Implications of the Care Act 2014 
Since the original study was carried out, the Care Bill has been drafted and received royal 
assent to become the Care Act 2014.
11
 The Care Act gives people a legal entitlement to a 
care and support plan and a personal budget. Previously, these had been set out in guidance 
only, with no legal requirement that they should be provided.
12
 The enshrining of personal 
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budgets in law means that council-managed personal budget users should, without 
exception, be informed of the amount of their budget and have choice in how it is used. The 
Care Act also gives local authorities responsibility for promoting the efficient and effective 
operation of the care market with a view to ensuring that there are a variety of high quality 
providers to choose from and that people needing care have sufficient information to make 
informed decisions. Part of this market shaping activity should be achieved through local 
authorities producing Market Position Statements  W publicly available reports aimed at 
signalling care and support needs to the market, as well as how local authorities intend to 
purchase care.
13
 
 
Developments in commissioning and contracting for personalisation 
Local authorities had for many years been, in effect, the sole purchaser of home care 
services. As such, they had vast purchasing power and were thus able to influence the home 
care market through their contracting systems. Typically, relatively small numbers of 
providers held large block or cost and volume contracts that required the capacity to deliver 
significant numbers of hours of care, often within defined geographical areas. Other 
providers were offered spot contracts to help fill any gaps in provision when they arose. This 
system was advantageous from the point of view of local authorities as it enabled them to 
achieve economies of scale through bulk buying.
14
 However, it also meant that there was 
little flexibility or choice of provider for service users.  
 
Prior to the original study, many local authorities had begun a transition from large block or 
cost and volume contracts to framework agreements whereby providers bid for the right to 
offer services, but with no guarantee of any business.
15
 The local authorities in the original 
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study were at different stages of introducing framework agreements; one was just setting 
up its first framework agreement for social care whereas the other two had had agreements 
in place for three to four years. All three had introduced brokerage systems whereby local 
authority staff, called brokers, were responsible for the practical arrangements of matching 
the needs of service users with a suitable home care provider from the framework.  
 
/ŶŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝŶŐĂŶĞǁĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ ‘ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŐĂƚĞǁĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ
enhanced brokerage, Rowlett
14
 suggested that if local authorities continued to commission 
services through traditional, centralised models, older people not using direct payments 
may miss out on opportunities for choice available to direct payment holders. He defined 
service gateways as mechanisms by which local authorities could enable individual service 
users to choose from any provider in the market while ensuring a minimum standard of 
quality. Thus his proposed service gateways have similarities to framework agreements. 
Rowlett speculated on the potential benefits of the service gateway model; these included 
genuine choice and control, risk borne by providers rather than the local authority, a wide 
range of available services and the stimulation of innovation. 
 
Findings from the original study 
The original study,
1-3
 among other things, concluded that framework and brokerage 
arrangements had the potential to promote greater efficiency in local care markets. 
However, at the time of the study fieldwork, these effects appeared to be limited by two 
things. First, local policy decisions to restrict the numbers of providers on framework 
agreements. Specifically, it seemed that commissioners wanted to increase competition 
between providers by increasing the number of providers they purchased from, but were 
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wary about oversubscribing the framework and so leaving providers open to the risk of not 
being able to win sufficient work to remain financially viable. Second, there were 
communication challenges created by the new broker roles. Although the broker system 
was developed to enable better matching of personal budget holders with home care 
support, the system did not always work as planned. In addition, the study found that some 
potentially influential market development and shaping activities had only just been 
initiated in the study sites and their impact, particularly on services for people using 
managed personal budgets, was yet to be realised.  
 
We therefore returned to the three study sites at the beginning of 2014 and conducted 
further fieldwork to explore what developments had been undertaken in attempts to 
improve the choice and flexibility available to older people using council-managed budgets. 
Specifically, we were interested in how framework agreements and the numbers of 
providers on them had changed, and why; how brokerage systems were functioning and 
ŚŽǁǁĞůůďƌŽŬĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĂďůĞƚŽŵĂƚĐŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?We also 
looked at market development activities, including the development of Market Position 
Statements.  
 
METHODS 
The original study took place in three local authorities selected because they were actively 
making changes to help develop their local markets and facilitate choice for older people 
using council-managed personal budgets, and had large proportions both of older people 
and of people using council-managed personal budgets in their populations. These councils 
included a London Borough, a rural county and a predominantly sub-urban authority.  
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In this follow-up study, we conducted in-depth telephone interviews with one service 
development/commissioning manager and one senior broker from each local authority. 
Interviews with service development managers concentrated on developments in relation 
to framework agreements since the earlier study, and market development activities such 
as initiatives to encourage new service developments, engagement with providers and 
information management. Brokers were interviewed about the brokerage systems, routine 
practice, knowledge about the market and information exchange. These interviews were 
audio recorded and transcribed in full. Analysis involved summarising the transcripts and 
grouping the data around the specific themes discussed in the interviews.  
 
FINDINGS 
Challenges of framework agreements 
When the original research was undertaken in 2011/12, each of the three study sites had 
framework agreements in place with their home care providers. The framework agreement 
was new in one authority but had been in place three to four years in the other two. 
Framework agreements set out the price, quality and other terms on which the local 
authority will purchase services. Providers tender to be on the framework. Local authorities 
purchase services only from providers on the framework. However, unlike block or cost and 
volume contracts, there is no guarantee of being offered any business. The National Market 
Development Forum
16
 has suggested that framework agreements may reduce contract 
management time and increase competition. By the time of the follow-up interviews in 
2014, there had been no significant changes in the numbers of providers on the frameworks 
in two sites, although the third no longer used a framework agreement. However, a number 
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of issues had arisen as a result of the framework agreements in the intervening period (see 
Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Challenges of framework agreements 
x Number of framework providers is not a good indicator of choice 
x Closed agreements can limit short term ability to repopulate frameworks 
x Reduced financial certainty for providers can affect capacity to respond to demand 
 
 
 
Many providers but limited choice 
First, local authorities had realised that the total number of providers on the framework was 
not necessarily a good indicator of the number of providers available to choose from as not 
all providers offered services in all geographical areas, and some never took any packages at 
all. Service development managers interviewed felt that one of the reasons for this was that 
there was no obligation on providers to take on any business. Under the previous block or 
cost and volume contracting systems, providers had been obliged to take on additional 
packages of care if they were delivering at below contracted capacity. With framework 
agreements, this was not the case. In addition, providers were not obliged through the 
frĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŽŬĞĞƉƉĂĐŬĂŐĞƐŽĨĐĂƌĞ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ‘ŚĂŶĚ
ďĂĐŬƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƉĂĐŬĂŐĞƐŽĨĐĂƌĞǁĞƌĞŚĂŶĚĞĚďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝĨƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌǁĂƐ
struggling to deliver the package. Again, under previous contracting systems, hand backs 
were reported to be more difficult to make, for example, they were not allowed routinely as 
a result of temporary recruitment problems.  
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Closed contracts 
Second, although some of these capacity issues might have been alleviated by increasing the 
number of providers on the framework, one manager mentioned that this was not possible 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ĐůŽƐĞĚ ? ?dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚŽŶĐĞƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ
process had been completed, no additional providers could be placed on the framework 
until ƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ƵƐƵĂůůǇŝŶƚŚƌĞĞƚŽĨŽƵƌǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƚŝŵĞ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?
having closed agreements was thought to be one of the reasons why some providers gained 
places on the framework but never opted to take any care packages; it was believed that 
some providers had little intention of taking on any council-managed packages of care 
immediately, but applied for places on the framework to keep that potential funding stream 
open - just in case they wanted to take on any council-managed packages before the next 
tender. Brokers in one local authority found that they had to set up spot contracts with 
providers outside the framework agreement in order to fill gaps in capacity. 
 
Unexpected gaps in capacity 
A third, unforeseen, consequence of framework ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐǁĂƐĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?
capacity to take on packages of care over school holidays. This came about because the end 
of block or cost and volume contracts meant the end of guaranteed work (and therefore 
income) for providers. According to local authority managers, this left providers unable to 
guaranteed income to their care workers; some providers had therefore changed their 
terms and conditions for care workers to zero hours contracts. The result was that care 
workers were often opting not to work during school holidays because they were uncertain 
whether their earnings would cover the costs of childcare. This created an unexpected gap 
in provision during Christmas and summer holidays. 
10 
 
Potential solutions 
To help reduce gaps in geographical provision, two local authorities were considering 
splitting their frameworks into separate rural and urban areas or neighbourhoods so they 
could work more closely with providers willing to offer services in each area. In the rural 
county, each member of the service development team had responsibility for understanding 
the local economy and home care market in one area; the sub-urban authority worked in 
locality-based teams and was considering organising the framework into these localities in 
the hope that this would help them understand how many providers were active in each 
area.  
 
One local authority had not renewed its framework agreement. This was because the local 
authority was in a transition stage, driven by a perceived desire by direct payment users to 
employ personal assistants, and to align council-managed personal budget users ? options 
with those open to direct payment users. Instead of a framework, users of council-managed 
personal budgets could, in theory, use any suitable provider.  
 
The brokerage system for managed personal budget users 
The findings from the original study suggested that brokers played an important role in 
improving the efficient operation of local care markets and in facilitating the purchase of 
individual service packages as they had a unique overview of the supply of, and demand for, 
home care services in their localities. Brokers in this context were local authority-employed 
staff who acted as intermediaries between managed personal budget holders and home 
care providers. BƌŽŬĞƌƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƉůĂŶƐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?
needs from support planners, and used this information to source suitable providers. 
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Brokers in all three sites worked with older people using home care services; the sites varied 
in whether the same brokerage team offered services to younger adults, people with 
dementia and for end of life care. The brokers in these three study sites did not offer a 
brokerage service to direct payment users.  
 
dŚĞďƌŽŬĞƌƐ ?ƌŽůĞ ?ĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇŝŶƚĞƌviewees in the original study, was to identify the 
most appropriate provider from those ŽŶƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?framework agreements. In 
ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞƚŽĨŝŶĚƚŚĞďĞƐƚŵĂƚĐŚďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
care available, as quickly as possible. In practice, the process as described by brokers in 2014 
appeared to have developed differently across the three study sites.  
 
Brokerage systems in practice 
In one site, the brokers emailed  ‘ŵŝŶŝ-ƚĞŶĚĞƌ ?ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐĨŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽall providers on the 
framework ?ƚǁŝĐĞĂĚĂǇĂƚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚŝŵĞƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚĞŶŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬĂŶĚƚǁŽŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬ ?Home 
care agencies with the capacity to provide the support requested had one hour from 
receiving the email to respond. If more than one provider responded, the brokers looked for 
the best match, based on the relevant training of care workers in those providers and 
whether or not they already provided care to other service users in the same geographical 
area. The broker interviewed noted that it was thĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶsibility to sell 
themselves by explaining ŚŽǁƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚďĞƐƚŵĞĞƚƚŚĂƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ ? Brokers in 
another site (the rural county) used a similar system but were restricted to emailing 
requests to providers within certain geographical limits. In the site with no framework 
agreement, the procedure for identifying providers was reported to be based on the 
relationship the brokers had built up with them over the course of previous contracts, 
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particularly with providers that had proved to be reliable and able to take packages at short 
notice. In this site, brokers telephoned each provider in turn to find out about their 
availability. 
 
ƌŽŬĞƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨŵĂƚĐŚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐǁŝƚŚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĐĂƌĞ 
Travelling was reported to be a big issue in the rural county. Some areas were said to be so 
remote that brokers sometimes found that they were not able to source a suitable provider 
from the framework in spite of offering financial incentives in the form of additional 
payments to cover travel expenses. Where suitable providers could not be found, brokers 
searched for non-framework providers and set up spot contracts with them. This system 
was reported to be a lengthy process which caused delays in setting up packages of care. 
Managed personal budget holders in this situation had to wait until a contract was set up or 
accept another less acceptable provider if one was available. For people discharged from 
hospital, brokers sometimes had to arrange short term care until a more appropriate 
package could be arranged.  
 
MatcŚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůďƵĚŐĞƚŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌĐĂƌĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐǁŚŽƐƉŽŬĞŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐŽƌǁŚŽŶĞĞĚĞĚ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞƵƉ ?ǀŝƐŝƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚǁŽĐĂƌĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĐĂƵƐĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶ
two sites. Brokers felt that lack of capacity impacted on their ability to source home care 
ƚŚĂƚŵĞƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐďƌŽŬĞƌƐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚĨŽƌĨĂŵŝůǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐ
to act as a second care worker. Other times, they attempted to overcome these obstacles 
by, for example, trying to source two providers to work together, each providing one care 
worker. However, providers were reluctant to make such arrangements: 
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 ‘^ŽŵĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐũƵƐƚǁŽŶ ?ƚĚŽŝƚĂƚĂůů ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŐŽƚƚŽ
match up the times. Providers are liŬĞ ? “tĞůů ?ǁŚŽƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞůĞĂĚ ?Which 
prov  W you know, which care agency, you know, has the  W ?ŝƚĐĂŶũƵƐƚďĞ
very comƉůĞǆĂŶĚƚƵƌŶĂďŝƚĐŽŶǀŽůƵƚĞĚ ? ? 
 
The broker in one site felt that a lack of sufficient information given to brokers, and 
therefore providers, sometimes resulted in inappropriate packages of care being set up or 
inappropriate providers delivering the care. This caused additional work for brokers who 
had to re-arrange the packages and source alternative providers. Providers tried to maintain 
a package of care until alternative arrangements were in place, but support planners 
sometimes intervened by by-passing brokers and speaking directly to alternative providers 
in attempts to speed up the process. The broker interviewed in that site appreciated this 
help and felt it did make the process quicker, especially when working with complex care 
packages, but she reported that other brokers did not approve. The broker in another site 
also reported that support planners sometimes by-passed them because they did not fully 
understand the role of brokers and because they felt under pressure from managers to find 
placements as quickly as possible. One broker considered it queue jumping if a support 
planner by-passed the broker to arrange care directly with a provider.  
 
ƌŽŬĞƌƐ ?ƌŽůĞƐŝŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ 
As well as the availability of services, the effective matching of supply of and demand for 
home care services relied on knowledge and information exchange. These were important 
ŝŶƚǁŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚǁĂǇƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ďƌŽŬĞƌƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?
needs as well as the services available to be able to communicate and match them 
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effectively. Second, brokers played a key role in feeding information about gaps in provision 
back into the commissioning and service development system. Thus, brokers played a 
pivotal role (see Figure 1). 
 
<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐ 
/ŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐ ?ďƌŽŬĞƌƐŝŶƚǁŽƐŝƚĞƐĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ ‘ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?
information from support planners to help source a provider. In the third site, however, the 
15 
 
broker interviewed felt that the level of information received from support planners was 
inadequate as it gave only a snapshot of needs, not the full picture:  
 
 ‘zŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞǇĂĚŝĂďĞƚŝc? Is there medication needs? What 
are the needs? Is it medication problems or is it actually administering 
the medication? You know, we  W the providers obviously need to know 
that. ƵƚŝĨǁĞ ?ƌĞŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐŵĂĚĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůƐƚĂŐĞƐ ?ǁĞ
ĚŽŶ ?ƚĂůǁĂǇƐƐĞĞƚŚĂƚďŝŐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?
 
This broker also reported that the feedback she received from providers was that they were 
ŶŽƚŐŝǀĞŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐ ?^ŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚŝƐĂƐ
she and the other brokers could only provide the limited information they were given.  
 
Knowledge of providers and capacity 
Brokers in all three sites relied on their previous experience with providers for knowledge 
about capacity but also on frequent contacts from providers (from daily to fortnightly, 
depending on the site). In the rural site, despite brokers having daily contact with providers, 
they felt information about capacity could be improved and that their job of sourcing 
providers could be made easier if they knew which providers definitely had capacity at 
specified times:  
 
 ‘ ?ĐĂƵƐĞĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĞũƵƐƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƵƐƵĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůů
ĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬĂŶĚƐĂǇ ? “tĞŚĂǀĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ?Žƌ ? “tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ? ?
if you know a particular provider definitely has availability at these times 
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ĂŶĚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ of 
contacting 12 providers, you know, you only need to contact four. ? 
 
Brokers in two sites reported that the only time they received feedback from support 
planners was when there was a problem with a package. They felt getting positive feedback 
was also important as it would help them keep their knowledge of providers up to date.  
 
Upstream information flows 
As well as using their knowledge to source providers, brokers played an integral part in 
feeding information back up the system to the commissioning and service development 
teams. In each of the sites, the service development teams were reported to work closely 
with re-ablement and outreach teams, support planners, brokers, service users and 
providers to gather data for analysis. Specific examples given included data on gaps in 
services and difficult to place clients such as those with challenging behaviour. One site used 
a team of volunteers to visit service users and ask about the services they were receiving, 
including any services they would like to receive but were not getting. In another, the 
market development team met regularly with support planners to discuss what issues were 
emerging from support plans, for example, gaps in services. The team supplemented this 
information by looking at samples of support plans. This information was fed variously in the 
three sites to market intelligence officers and managers responsible for developing 
framework agreements and Market Position Statements.  
 
In one site, the broker interviewed had never experienced a problem in finding an 
appropriate provider (except temporarily during school holidays) and so had no experience 
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of feeding such information back into the system. In another site, brokers informed their 
manager about any gaps in services and in the third the commissioning team was informed 
every two weeks of any packages of care that took more than three days to arrange (as an 
indication of gaps in capacity). Brokers in both these sites did not know what happened to 
the information they passed on; one broker assumed it would prompt commissioners to 
source new providers but the other did not feel that it had any impact:  
 
 ‘/ƚ ?Ɛ  ?ǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ? beyond my remit, and to be 
quite honest with you, sometimes I feel that suggestions that I have 
madĞĂƌĞůŝŬĞ ? “KŬĂǇ ?/ ?ǀĞůŝƐƚĞŶĞĚƚŽĂĨĞǁŽĨ W ƚŽ ǇŽƵƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
but nothing. ? 
 
Engaging the market 
Figure 2 gives examples of methods used to facilitate market engagement and increase 
diversity. These examples are described below. 
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e-market websites to assist with choosing providers 
A guide on commissioning for provider diversity
17
 ŐŝǀĞƐ ‘ƚŽƉƚŝƉƐ ?ĨŽƌĞŝƚŚĞƌŐƌĂĚƵĂůŽƌƌĂĚŝĐĂů
steps to commissioning for personalisation. One recommendation is to ensure that there is 
an effective e-market in place to link citizens and providers. All three local authorities in this 
study were developing their e-market websites. E-market websites were essentially 
websites that enabled providers to advertise to potential customers. In the local authority 
with no framework agreement, the e-market website was, according to the service 
development manager interviewed, central to current arrangements for enabling council-
managed personal budget holders to select providers as, although they could purchase from 
any provider, it was unlikely they would use any not on the e-market site. Neither of the 
other two websites was currently being used to enable council-managed personal budget 
holders to choose providers, but this was the long term intention. They were aimed 
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primarily at self-funders and direct payment users, at the moment. One had developed from 
a local authority-led initiative to enable micro-providers to share advertising costs but now 
included providers of all sizes, both on and off the framework, and so was useful in helping 
non-framework providers build a client base and learn about opportunities in the council 
area. The other was essentially an advertising place for providers, but the plan was to 
develop it into a more interactive site where council-managed personal budget holders 
could commission their own care from budgets held by the council, and where providers 
could advertise the times at which they had spare capacity. None of the brokers interviewed 
mentioned using the e-market websites as a source of information or way of engaging with 
providers.  
 
 
Provider forums for fostering engagement 
All three councils in the study held provider forums - meetings that aimed to foster 
engagement and offer opportunities for exchanging information and ideas. In one council 
the forum was restricted to providers on the framework, but there was another forum 
based around the e-market website which was open to all providers. Any provider could 
attend forum meetings at the other two councils. The rural county authority actively sought 
potential members from a wide geographical area including neighbouring authority areas. 
Market Position Statements were developed in conjunction with members of these forums; 
they also gave feedback on the content of them, for example, how helpful the information 
in the Market Position Statements would be to providers new to the area. Forums tended to 
meet every two to three months and were seen by service development managers as good 
opportunities for providers and commissioning staff to share ideas, learn about the market 
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in different geographical areas, network, talk about new developments, share good practice 
and discuss training.  
 
Initiatives to increase diversity and capacity 
In the earlier study, two of the case study sites had described quite different ways of 
encouraging new market developments. One had employed market development officers to 
take a lead in initiating activity and directing the market, and the other had offered 
innovation funds, leaving it up to providers to identify and develop ideas. The latter also 
ƉŝůŽƚĞĚĂƐĐŚĞŵĞƚŚĞǇĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨĨ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůďƵĚŐĞƚƐ ?dŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐǁŝƚŚ
these and other initiatives to increase diversity in provision.  
 
 
Market development officer activities 
The market development officers were still in place which, the manager claimed, was 
testament to their effectiveness. The team consisted of a manager and two officers, plus 
close collaboration with a service user engagement officer. The team encompassed 
developments around prevention as well as procurement and market intelligence. One of 
the things that the team had provided was learning events that brought together support 
planners, providers and other key players. The purpose was to help all parties think about 
the type of services someone with a personal budget might want to buy. For example, 
providers had been asked to give presentations on what support they offered to personal 
budget holders and support planners had responded with their views on what would make 
them more likely to recommend these services to personal budget users. Some events had 
also been held to bring together service users and providers.  
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During the ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐŽůĚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁĞĞŬ ?ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ
the chance to bid for £500 to run events to encourage older people to get out and about. 
The purpose was to help older people to become aware of the range of opportunities 
available for getting out of the house, and to encourage local providers to offer more of 
these and similar opportunities. The manager felt it was difficult to measure the impacts of 
these and other schemes as they were often about changing perceptions and knowledge of 
both service users and providers, and affected all older people, not just those using 
managed personal budgets.  
 
 
 
Mini-personal budget pilots 
ŶŽƚŚĞƌůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŚĂĚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƉŝůŽƚŝŶŐ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨĨ ?personal budgets of £300 for older 
people during the original study. The aim was to encourage older people to manage a 
budget and overcome some of the mystery and fear associated with using a direct payment. 
The council had already run similar pilots for people with mental health problems and for 
carers. Both were successful in that people were keen to be part of the pilot. However, very 
few people took part in the older peoplĞ ?ƐƉŝůŽƚ ?dŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƉĂƌƚŽĨ
the reason for few people taking part was that the organisations delivering the pilot were 
either under-resourced to recruit people or were simply not committed to it, rather than 
the older people not being interested. Whatever the reasons, the pilot was not successful in 
giving older people confidence to manage their own budget.  
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Support for provider-led initiatives 
The local authority that had previously offered innovation funds as a way of stimulating 
ideas had been unable to continue the scheme due to lack of funds. However, one of the 
other councils had introduced innovation grants of £9,000 each. These had been available to 
providers across adult social care, not just home care or older people. Pilots focussing on 
prevention or helping people to spend personal budgets in different ways were being 
encouraged. Eight grants had been awarded at the time of the interviews, but it was too 
early to assess any impact.  
 
The local authority that had been unable to offer more innovation fund grants had instead 
tried to help local social enterprises and other small organisations obtain development 
money from other sources, although to date none of these had been for home care services. 
Another council was also trying to support the development of small businesses in adult 
social care by working closely with the social enterprise Community Catalysts. Community 
Catalysts works with local councils and others to promote the effective provision of 
accommodation, care and support for vulnerable adults within small-scale community 
settings.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper has presented findings about framework agreements, brokerage systems and 
other activities aimed at enabling choice in home care services for older people using 
council-managed personal budgets. The findings show a range of activities are taking place 
and highlight aspects of these developments that are challenging for those implementing 
them. The follow-up study on which these findings are based, however, was small 
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(comprising six interviews across three local authorities) and so the findings should not be 
considered generalizable. Instead, they provide an indication of the types of developments 
being undertaken and associated challenges. Although the findings give an update on 
developments since the earlier study, they are themselves located in a fast moving 
environment.  
 
This follow-up study was undertaken primarily to explore two issues that had arisen from 
the original study: balancing the number of providers on frameworks to encourage 
competition but limit the risk to providers of insufficient business to remain financially 
viable; and communication issues that affected the proper functioning of the brokerage 
systems. We also considered other developments aimed at engaging the market and 
increasing diversity.  
 
Shifts in power? 
In relation to the number of providers on the frameworks, the findings show that there had 
been no significant change in the number in two sites. Service development managers in all 
three sites were not aware of any providers that had had insufficient business to remain 
viable. Indeed, it appeared difficult to find providers willing to take on some packages of 
care, either because of rural/travel issues or the complexities of the package. This suggests 
that there are in fact insufficient providers with appropriate capacity on the frameworks in 
ƐŽŵĞĂƌĞĂƐ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚďǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ĐůŽƐĞĚ ?ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽ
recruit additional providers between scheduled tenders. It is the providers that appear to be 
able to choose whether or not to take a package of care, rather than the brokers and service 
users being able to choose from a range of providers. This also indicates a shift in the 
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balance of power from local authorities (that used to be sole purchasers able to use 
contracts to oblige providers to deliver packages of care) to providers (that are now able to 
pick and choose which packages of care they wish to deliver). Thus, framework contracts 
may have increased competition between providers but have also increased uncertainty for 
local authorities and managed personal budget holders. 
 
Moving beyond framework agreements 
ZŽǁůĞƚƚ ?Ɛ14 proposed service gateway and enhanced brokerage can be seen as one step 
beyond a framework agreement as, although minimum quality and other terms would be 
agreed in advance, providers would be free to set their own prices and the types of services 
they intended to offer. Under framework agreements, prices are agreed in advance. 
ZŽǁůĞƚƚ ?ƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ gateway would include all providers whereas framework agreements 
involve tendering for places. The model developed by the study site which had opted to 
abandon its framework agreement in favour of an e-market website for all Care Quality 
Commission registered or local authority-approved providers appears very similar to that 
proposed by Rowlett. The local authority that intended to develop its e-market website into 
an interactive facility for service users to commission their own support may also be moving 
in a similar direction. It is interesting, however, that the brokers interviewed for this study 
did not use, or help managed personal budget users to use, the e-market websites to select 
providers. This suggest there is a long way to go in increasing awareness of these facilities 
and their potential uses to practitioners and managed personal budget users. It remains to 
be seen what the long term impact of these systems will be for these people.  
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Ongoing information and communication challenges 
In considering the effective functioning of the brokerage systems, communication issues 
appeared to remain a challenge. For the proper operation of brokerage, appropriate 
information needs to flow from service users, via support planners to brokers and then 
providers. This study has found that information flowing from support planners to brokers 
was often considered insufficient by brokers who then struggled to give providers the detail 
needed for them to make informed decisions about their ability to provide the care and 
support required. In addition, support planners (according to brokers) did not always appear 
to understand the holistic nature of the brokerage system or think it was the best way to 
arrange care. Challenges also existed in feeding information back into the system to improve 
both its functioning and the capacity and diversity of care on offer. Specifically, service 
development managers appeared to have a good understanding of information flows and 
how they worked, but brokers were less clear, particularly about the impact of any feedback 
they gave. It appears, therefore, that the understanding of practice at management levels 
does not necessarily equate to the experience of frontline staff such as brokers who act as 
intermediaries between service users and providers and between providers and service 
development staff. Developing and maintaining effective information flows and common 
understanding through all levels of the system is vital in making the most of market 
intelligence to facilitate market development.
18
 Market Position Statements were not, at the 
time of the study, universal, but there was evidence that market intelligence was being fed 
into the system to help with their development and that they were beginning to be used to 
engage local providers.  
 
 
26 
 
Potential efficiencies of brokerage systems 
It is not possible from this study to say anything definitive about the effectiveness or 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨƵƐŝŶŐďƌŽŬĞƌĂŐĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐƚŽŵĂƚĐŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ
from a pre-populated framework. However, it is possible to make some general comments. 
dŚĞŵŽǀĞĨƌŽŵůĂƌŐĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐǁŝƚŚĂĨĞǁƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ‘ŵŝŶŝ-ƚĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚůĂƌŐĞƌ
numbers of providers through a framework agreement can be seen as a shift from a quite 
centralised system to one which is more market-based, although still strongly managed. It 
might be that introducing brokers into the system has increased costs not only through 
additional staff costs but also through communication and other transaction costs. Any 
additional costs, however, might be offset by freeing support planners and social workers to 
undertake other activities. Local authorities might also face increased costs from no longer 
being able to achieve economies of scale through bulk buying,
14
 although it has been argued 
that framework agreements can reduce contracting costs.
16
 The costs and effectiveness of 
any of these changes, however, should be judged in relation to the outcomes for older 
people using managed personal budgets.  
 
Summary 
In summary, this study returned to three local authorities that took part in an earlier study 
about factors affecting the delivery of home care through managed personal budgets for 
older people. It found that progress has been made in developing systems and ironing out 
unanticipated effects. However, communication issues and information flows still need to 
be improved if systems are to work to their full potential. 
27 
 
 
References 
 
1. Baxter K, Rabiee P, Glendinning C. Managed personal budgets for older people: what 
are English local authorities doing to facilitate personalized and flexible care? Public 
Money & Management 2013;33(6):399-406. 
 
2. Rabiee P, Glendinning C, Baxter K. How far do managed personal budgets offer choice 
and control for older people using home care services? London: NIHR School for Social 
Care Research; 2013  
 
3. Rabiee P, Baxter K, Glendinning C. Supporting choice  W the role of support planning in 
facilitating personalisation for older people using managed personal budgets. Journal of 
Social Work (forthcoming). 
 
4. Davey V, Fernandez J-L, Knapp M, Vick N, Jolly D, Swift P, et al. Direct payments: a 
national survey of direct payments policy and practice. London: Personal Social Services 
Research Unit, London School of Economics and Political Science; 2007. 
 
5. The NHS Information Centre. Community Care statistics 2010-11, tables and charts. 
Leeds: The Information Centre for Health and Social Care; 2012.  
 
6. Care Services Improvement Partnership. Key activities in commissioning social care. 
Lessons from the Care Services Improvement Partnership commissioning examplar 
project. Department of Health; 2007. 12 December 2012. 
 
7. Glendinning C, Challis D, Fernandez J-L, Jacobs S, Jones K, Knapp M, et al. Evaluation of 
the Individual Budgets pilot programme: final report. York: University of York, Social 
Policy Research Unit; 2008.  
 
8. Ellis K. Direct Payments and Social Work Practice: The significance of 'Street-Level 
Bureaucracy' in determining eligibility. Br J Soc Work. 2007;37(3):405-22. 
 
9. ůůŝƐ< ? ‘^ƚƌĞĞƚ-level bƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ ?revisited: the changing face of frontline discretion in 
adult social care in England. Social Policy & Administration. 2011;45(3):221-44. 
 
10. Commission for Social Care Inspection. Direct payments: what are the barriers? London: 
Commission for Social Care Inspection; 2004.  
 
11. Great Britain [Internet]. Care Act 2014; Chapter 23. 2014. [Accessed 2014 May 29]. 
Available from: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/care.html  
 
12. Department of Health [Internet]. Factsheet 4. The Care Bill  W personalising care and 
support planning. 2014. [Accessed 2014 August 27] Avalable from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-bill-factsheets  
 
28 
 
13. Department of Health [Internet]. Factsheet 1. The Care Bill - general responsibilities of 
local authorities: prevention, information and market-shaping. 2014. [Accessed 2014 
August 27] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-bill-
factsheets  
 
14. Rowlett N. Letting go of the power: why social care authorities need to start from 
scratch to deliver choice and control. Journal of Care Services Management, 
2009;3(4):334-56. 
 
15. Centre of Excellence South East [Internet]. Procurement Frameworks- all aboard for 
greater efficiency? 2007. [Accessed 2014 April 17]. Available from: 
http://www.wlscb.org.uk/sece_-_procurement_frameworks_-_nov_07.pdf   
 
16. National Market Development Forum. How will 'personalisation' change the way 
services are procured? Discussion Paper 3. London: Think Local Act Personal; 2010.  
 
17. Community Catalysts and Shared Lives Plus [Internet]. Commissioning for provider 
diversity  W a guide. 2013. [accessed 2014 March 25] Available from: 
http://www.thinklocalactpersonal.org.uk/Browse/commissioning/developing/?parent=
8567&child=9517   
 
18. IPC Market Analysis Centre. Department of Health developing care markets for  
quality and choice programme. What is market facilitation? Oxford: Oxford Brookes 
University; 2012.  
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
